Employment Tribunal Reforms to Boost the Economy by Mangan, David
409
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 4, December 2013  © Industrial Law Society; all rights reserved. For permissions, please   
e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
doi:10.1093/indlaw/dwt021
© Industrial Law Society; all rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.
permissions@oup.com.
Recent LegisLation
employment tribunal Reforms to Boost the economy
1. IntroductIon
One of the more ignored aspects of employment law is tribunal procedure. To 
this neglected area the Coalition Government has brought in a host of reforms to 
address what is regarded as an economic imperative. This commentary considers 
the employment law reforms contained in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013, Part 2.1 Coming at the mid-way point in the Coalition’s planned reforms 
which are scheduled to be fully introduced as of 2015,2 this legislative overhaul of 
employment tribunal procedure has been linked to efforts to improve the country’s 
economy. Government reports published leading up to the passage of the legislation 
offer guidance to the new framework. The package contains a negative and singular 
view of employment litigation. The Act and Regulations may assist employers, but 
more remarkable is the Government’s ambivalence regarding rights. These reforms 
put into question access to redress for potential infringements of employment rights 
and emphasise the use of law as a tool for economic stimulation rather than a source 
of rights protection.
This commentary first briefly situates the package within a continuum of proce-
dural changes and then outlines the long-standing discussion regarding Employment 
Tribunal reform. The next segment delves into the reforms by considering three pro-
visions which are: the requirement for claimants to report their claims to Acas first; 
fees for launching claims; and settlement offers. This discussion is interspersed with 
references to Government documents anticipating the changes. Based on these fore-
going sections, the final portion of this commentary investigates instructive themes 
emerging from the current reforms package. The Coalition’s plans are of particular 
importance to small-to-medium-sized (SME) and microbusinesses. The emphasis of 
employment regulation is being shifted to that of an easy-to-use format accessible to 
those entirely unfamiliar with these regulations. Together this package suggests fun-
damental change in employment law: a retrenchment of the parameters for access to 
1 2013 Chapter  24. Royal Assent 25 April 2013 [ERRA]) as well as the Employment 
Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 (in force as of July 2013 
[2013 Regulations].
2 BIS, Employment Law 2013: Progress on Reform (March 2013) [Progress on Reform], 18.
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redress which has the potential to limit the enforcement of recognised employment 
rights, especially when determined by their impact on business.
2. SItuatIng the Procedural reformS
a. an Issue in Perennial development
The benchmark for Employment Tribunals has been the statement from the 
Donovan Royal Commission: a procedure which is ‘easily accessible, informal, 
speedy and inexpensive’.3 The phrase has become a mantra but not dogma since 
informality has arguably given way to formality. As a result of fees being introduced 
as a precondition for claims, accessibility has now come into question. Speed within 
an efficiency context is the focal point. With the ERRA and the 2013 Regulations, 
costs have been confirmed as a paramount concern.
The costs associated with raising claims have been an underlying issue for some 
time. In 1994, the Green Paper Resolving Employment Rights Disputes—Options for 
Reform Cmnd. 2707/94 suggested tribunals be given the power to dismiss claims at 
a pre-hearing review.4 The proposal was not realised until the Employment Tribunal 
(Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, SI 2004//1861. These 
Regulations targeted a reduction in the number of claims. Estimates for 2005–6 were a 
reduction between 28,000 and 32,000 claims.5 Rule 3 of the 2004 Regulations provided 
little guidance as to when a claim may not be accepted other than mention of ‘weed-
ing out’ those deemed ‘ultimately … unsuccessful in any event’. These Regulations 
granted the power to strike out a claim at a pre-hearing review (regulation 18(7)(b)). 
Prior to 2004, the 2001 Regulations SI 2001/1171, regulation 7(4) only permitted a 
deposit order if the Tribunal thought the case was hopeless and allowed the case to 
be struck out if the deposit was not paid. The 2001 Regulations appeared to be similar 
to the 1993 Regulations (SI 1993/2687). The role of the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (Acas) was prominent at this time as it was relied upon to realise 
reduction targets.6 In the middle of this period there was the short-lived Employment 
Act 2002 which also aimed at reducing the number of cases headed to Tribunal by 
emphasising dispute resolution; for example through setting out a formal process for 
dismissal (Schedule 2); time for settlement of disputes (section 24); and permitting 
costs for expenses for preparation time (section 22). The ethos behind the 2002 Act 
3 HMSO, Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 
(1968) Cmnd 3623, 156.
4Resolving Employment Rights Disputes—Options for Reform Cmnd. 2707/94, at [6.21].
5 Employment Relations Directorate, ‘Amendment of Tribunal Regulations’ (July 2004) [2004 
Regulations Explanatory Notes], [14], [35].
6 2004 Regulations Explanatory Notes, [45].
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was that ‘there would be fewer employment disputes if there were effective discipli-
nary and grievance procedures in the workplace’.7 By the time Gibbons reported, the 
new statute was deemed to have failed.8 In discussing the impact of Labour’s Routes 
to Resolution: Improving Dispute Resolution in Britain (DTI, July 2001) and its leg-
islative manifestation, the Employment Act 2002, Davies and Freedland remark: ‘it 
is hard to avoid the conclusion that its proposals quite extensively crossed the line 
which separates measures to facilitate the settlement of disputes from measures to 
stifle the assertion of the rights which might give rise to disputes’.9 Sanders describes 
the Employment Act 2008 which replaced the 2002 Act as an example of proceeding 
through a ‘new era in unfair dismissal law in which ‘economic prosperity’ dominates 
‘social justice’ to a degree not seen before’.10
As changes have been made to Employment Tribunal procedures, the target of 
reform has become more precise: those ‘whose intent or action is to waste time and 
drain valuable tribunal resources’.11 For many including the Government the persis-
tence of slow economic recovery coupled with the perception of wasted expenditure 
for employers as a result of employment regulation has prompted the present changes.
B. the case for reform
The debate surrounding the qualification period for employment law protections 
illustrates the case for reform. In April 2012, a new qualification period of two years 
of consecutive employment with the same employer came into effect (section 108, 
Employment Rights Act 1996, as amended by the Unfair Dismissal and Statement of 
Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012). Addressing the 
argument for extension of the qualification period, Adrian Beecroft wrote of the dif-
ficulty employers had in making such an important determination within one year of 
employing an individual.12 Of note, SMEs have been found to be less likely to have 
unfair dismissal claims made against them.13 Ewing and Hendy launched a fervent 
critique of the extended period.14 The authors challenged the premise of the reforms 
7 A. Sanders, ‘Part One of the Employment Act 2008: “Better” Dispute Resolution?’ (2009) 
38 ILJ 30, 34.
8 M. Gibbons, Better Dispute Resolution: A  Review of Employment Dispute Resolution in 
Great Britain (London: DTI, 2007) [Gibbons], 5.
9 P. Davies and M. Freedland, Towards a Flexible Labour Market: Labour Legislation and 
Regulation Since the 1990s (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 65.
10 Sanders, 31.
11 Gibbons, [4.40]; though a small number was identified [4.39].
12 A. Beecroft, Report on Employment Law (24 October 2011) [Beecroft], 4.
13 G. Saridakis, S. Sen-Gupta, P. Edwards and D.  J. Storey, ‘The Impact of Enterprise Size 
on Employment Tribunal Incidence and Outcomes: Evidence from Britain’ (2008) 46 British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 469–99 [Saridakis et al], 483.
14 K. Ewing and J. Hendy, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes—Unfair?’ (2012) 41 ILJ 115–21.
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pointing to the absence of support for the assertion: ‘In the light of the government’s 
statistics, it is therefore hard to understand Mr Osborne’s comment that introducing 
tribunal fees would end “the one way bet against small businesses”’.15
The Coalition’s plan links Employment Tribunal reforms with economic growth 
and in particular the growth of small-to-medium-sized businesses.16 To effect this 
development, emphasis is placed on cutting employment costs such as those related 
to claims brought by workers or former workers. The focus of the latest reforms is the 
costs associated with defending claims in the first place. For this reason, I depart some-
what from the arguments made by Ewing and Hendy. Their comments were prem-
ised on claimants’ lack of success at employment tribunals: 8% of unfair dismissal 
claims against employers are successful; employers had a 73% chance of success at 
tribunal.17 For the Government this fact is irrelevant because the cost (or at least the 
perception) arises when a claim is launched. Cost certainty for employers is the aim: 
‘The risk is that the fear of being faced with tribunal claims impedes growth because 
businesses become too cautious to hire people or to address capability issues in the 
workforce’.18 The current plan takes a different approach from Gibbons who sug-
gested early resolution of disputes (notably at an informal stage). The Government’s 
perspective on early resolution focuses on the benefits for one side: if claims arise, 
they should be disposed of before employers are to expend any financial resources.
The perceived ease in launching a claim and the associated costs founds employ-
ers’ concern over costs.19 This attitude can be found in other surveys of employers. 
For example, consider the following: 67% of employers believe employment regula-
tion is a barrier to the UK’s market competitiveness; 34% of claims are withdrawn 
by applicants; employers are four times more likely to win but 26% are still settling 
even when told they can win.20 These statistics reinforce employers’ and therefore the 
Government’s concern over wasted expenditure when it comes to employment claims.
3. the reformS
The procedural reforms of the ERRA and the 2013 Regulations present subtle yet 
nonetheless significant change. The aim of this paper is not to provide a comprehen-
sive listing of the reforms but to highlight three of particular note: the requirement 
15 Ibid., 120.
16 See, for example, Beecroft, 2.
17 Ewing and Hendy, 116.
18 Progress on Reform, 24.
19 E. Jordan, A. P. Thomas, J. W. Kitching and R. A. Blackburn, ‘Part A: Employer perceptions 
and the impact of employment regulation’ Employment Relations Research Series 123 (BIS, 
March 2013) (Jordan et al), 18.
20 Facing the Future: CBI/Harvey Nash Employment Trends Survey2012 (July 2012), 25–6.
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for claimants to report their claims to Acas first; fees for launching claims; and set-
tlement offers.
a. mandatory consultation with acas
Prior to submitting their claims to the tribunal, workers (prospective claimants) must 
report their claims details to Acas (section 7 of the ERRA adding section 18A to the 
Employment Tribunals Act 1996). During the prescribed period (which remains to 
be defined), a conciliation officer shall ‘endeavour to promote a settlement between 
the persons who would be parties to the proceedings’. If settlement is not possible 
or the period expires, the prospective claimant must obtain a certificate confirming 
such. Still, Acas conciliation is not mandatory (either party can refuse).21 Arguably, 
the voluntariness of conciliation continues a lack of commitment to dispute resolu-
tion between the parties (Sanders previously identified the absence of ‘meaningful 
commitment to ADR’).22
Mandatory consultation finds its basis in the idea of costs. Since fewer than one 
third of claimants sought out Acas, the Government speculates this body can reduce 
the number of claims which reach the tribunal by 12,000.23 The WERS 2011 suggests 
that many may continue to opt out of this process as the authors found few used 
dispute resolution.24 Mandating Acas be involved addresses the concerns of SMEs 
insofar as employers have not had to put out any money at this point and the claims 
may potentially be averted.
Other factors may affect the success of this plan. The problem with such heavy 
reliance on Acas is that there is currently a funding issue for the body.25 When the 
2004 Regulations came into effect, the Government budgeted £850,000 for imple-
mentation costs.26 There do not appear to be any such budgeted costs at present. 
One target for further funds would be adding to the number of caseworkers at Acas 
could better facilitate settling cases at an early stage.27 Unfortunately, the reporting 
requirement may form a gateway to further issues regarding the information pro-
vided to Acas and whether information is absent or the proper materials were pro-
vided. Aside from funding, claimants’ attitudes are clearly targeted by this measure. 
21 BIS, Ending the Employment Relationship: Government Response to Consultation (January 
2013) [Ending the Employment Relationship], [108].
22Sanders, 32.
23 BIS, Resolving workplace disputes: A consultation (January 2011) [Resolving workplace 
disputes], 21–2.
24 B. van Wanrooy, H. Bewley, A. Bryson, J. Forth, S. Freeth, L. Stokes and S. Wood, The 2011 
Workplace Employment Relations Study: First Findings (London: BIS, 2013) [WERS 2011], 27.
25 Ending the Employment Relationship, [60].
26 Employment Relations Directorate, ‘Amendment of Tribunal Regulations’ (July 2004), [21].
27 D. Renton and A. Macey, Justice Deferred: A critical guide to the Coalition’s employment 
tribunal reforms (Liverpool: Institute of Employment Rights, 2013) [Renton & Macey], 25.
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It appears that Acas’ filtering role will entail putting the realities of claims success to 
the individuals (claims forms now have the median awards listed for this purpose).
B. Introduction of fees for launching claims
The ethos behind the introduction of fees for launching claims is: those who use gov-
ernment services should pay for them.28 Fees can help to offset some of the planned 
23% budget reduction over four years which began in 2011.29 The Government 
expects to recover approximately 33% of the cost of employment tribunal pro-
ceedings through these fees.30 The introduction of fees suggests a departure from 
Gibbons’ recommendation that the system should be made cheaper.
The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013 
(SI 2013/1893) provides some idea as to the look of fees (in force 29 July 2013). 
There are two groupings of claims identified in the order, A  and B.  In Schedule 
2, Table 2, Type A claims are listed. Type B claims are said to be ‘All other claims’ 
(according to the explanatory note). Schedule 2, Table 3 outlines the costs: Type A—
an issuing fee of £160 and a hearing fee of £230; Type B—£250 as the issuing fee 
and £950 for a hearing. These are single claimant fees as there are higher rates for a 
group (Schedule 2, Table 4). In addition, BIS estimates employment tribunal hear-
ings cost claimants about £1,800 and employers £6,200.31 For appeals under the new 
fees regime, an appellant pays £400 for a notice of appeal and £1,200 for an oral 
hearing (sections 13, 14 of the Order). Rule 78(1)(c) of the 2013 Regulations permits 
‘reimbursement’ for all Tribunal fees within a costs order.
For those workers unaccustomed to such legal language, the order may prove 
challenging to follow. One can foresee Acas being called upon by claimants for guid-
ance as to the procedures and fees (especially when they are being shepherded that 
way). Employment rights are spread across a number of sources, and claims today 
often combine different rights. In itself, the procedure for launching a claim can dis-
suade. Many workers have found completing the preceding version of ET1 forms for 
claims to be a ‘daunting experience’.32
Upon meeting certain criteria regarding income, there is potential for remission 
of fees (full or partial) outlined in Schedule 3, Articles 2 and following. Some may 
suggest that qualifying individuals are the ones who are more likely to bring claims 
28 Resolving Workplace Disputes, 49.
29 Ibid., 49.
30See Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Stakeholder factsheet 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/employment/et-fees-factsheet.pdf (date last 
accessed 22 October 2013).
31 Progress on Reform, 26.
32 N. Busby and M. McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal 
System: Some Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 ILJ 166–83, 175.
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but abandon them. Saridakis et al found that pay at less than £25,000 per annum had 
a ‘positive effect on the probability of having an unfair dismissal case’.33 This will be 
a point to monitor as the impact of the reforms unfolds.
Fees for claims must be considered alongside the costs of raising a claim and 
losing. The 2013 Regulations have maintained the costs regime found in the 2004 
Regulations.34 For example, provision for a costs order is found in regulation 78 
and largely carries on from regulation 41 in the 2004 Regulations. Preparation time 
orders may still be made pursuant to regulation 79 (following on from regulation 42 
in the 2004 Regulations). Finally, wasted costs orders have been retained in regula-
tion 80 and largely draw from regulation 48 of the 2004 Regulations. Advice given 
to potential claimants must not only include the cost of filing and a hearing but also 
the possibility of a rather extensive range of powers to award costs against any party. 
Clearly, this is of particular concern to a worker who likely would not be in a satisfac-
tory position to pay, for example, £20,000 in costs pursuant to regulation 78(1)(a); 
let alone any further order which can exceed that figure pursuant to regulation 78(1)
(b)-(e) (see regulation 78(3)). This means that payees will bypass the County Court 
stage of assessment for costs up to £20,000. To borrow a phrase from defamation 
law, there is clear potential for the entirety of costs considerations to create a ‘chill-
ing effect’ dissuading those who may have claims to make. A judicial review of the 
fees was heard in Scotland where the Court of Session refused an interim interdict 
on the grounds of an undertaking by the Government that if the fees were found to 
be unlawful they would be refunded with interest and that the case required a full 
hearing. In England, the court granted a judicial review application regarding the 
lawfulness of the fees submitted by Unison but refused to grant an interim injunc-
tion to stop the fees from coming into force as scheduled.35
c. Settlement offers/Pre-termination negotiations
Amendments to settlement offers incentivise the early resolution of disputes.36 
Section 14 of the ERRA adds section 111A to the Employment Rights Act 1996 and 
hints at some of what the Government has planned. These negotiations remain inad-
missible at tribunal (section 111A(1),(2) Employment Rights Act 1996, as amended) 
except where there has been improper conduct (sections 111A (4),(5) as amended).
Again, much depends on the ‘critical role’ Acas continues to play.37 The Government 
will rely on Acas to set out ‘in accompanying guidance how the appropriate use of 
33 Saridakis et al, 483.
34 Though Underhill J identified some desire for change by the Minister: Fundamental Review 
of Employment Tribunal Rules (29 June 2012), 5.
35R. (On the Application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor (29 July 2013), QBD, unreported.
36 See Resolving Workplace Disputes, 37.
37 Busby and McDermont, 178.
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settlement agreements sits within broader good management practices, and the type 
of good practice we expect businesses will normally follow’.38 There will be no guide-
line tariff for settlement agreements because of opposition to it,39 but factors include:
1. Terms of contract such as remuneration, notice period, and untaken annual leave;
2. Length of employment;
3. Reason for offering settlement;
4. Length of time it would take to follow the full process for a fair dismissal if the 
employee refused the offer;
5. How difficult it would be to fill the post and the value of the individual to the 
organisation;
6. The individual’s perception of how long it would take them to find another 
job; and
7. The perceived liability to the employer of any potential employment tribunal 
claim.40
In response to consultation on settlement agreements, Acas will provide detailed 
assistance to parties such as guidance on ‘what parties need to do to make a settle-
ment agreement legally valid’ (including a ten calendar day period during which 
workers must consider such an agreement) and template letters.41 Not noted in 
the aforementioned Acas and government documents, Busby and McDermont’s 
research identified the need for clear parameters to Acas’ role which can be readily 
understood by service users. This step would seem necessary given the significant 
reliance on Acas for the success of these reforms.
The trigger for admissibility of settlement negotiations raises questions. Improper 
behaviour is the benchmark.42 Concerns about improper behaviour suggest that the 
premise is more about dispensing with claims.43 The focus on boosting the economy 
places the emphasis with regards to settlement offers on the disposal of claims so as to 
protect the financial resources of employers; thereby playing into the notion of vexatious 
litigants who waste employers’ financial resources. Recently, Acas has provided sparse 
commentary on what constitutes ‘improper behaviour’ within the context of settlement 
agreements.44 It will be with interest that the Acas guidance and the implementation of 
settlement offers will be monitored.
Overall, instruction should be taken from the impetus for the proposed procedural 
reforms: concerns over vexatious litigants and frivolous claims. Aim has been taken 
38 Ending the Employment Relationship, [36].
39 Ibid., [69].
40 Ibid., [76].
41 Acas, ‘Acas response to consultation on settlement agreements code’ (June 2013)  [Acas 
June 2013].
42 Ending the Employment Relationship, [37].
43 See Resolving Workplace Disputes, 37.
44Acas June 2013, Draft Code of Practice, [18].
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at perceived motivations of workers for pursuing claims. For example, rules 10, 11 and 
12 of the 2013 Regulations grant the Employment Tribunal the power to reject claims 
for failure to supply the minimum information (regulation 10 of the 2013 Regulations 
carries on from regulation 3 of the 2004 Regulations); the failure to pay the Tribunal 
fee (a new addition for 2013) (which will lead to the dismissal of a claim under regu-
lation 40); and for substantive defects (respectively). The new additions speak to the 
essence of the changes: a generalised view that claimants have used the system in a 
manner which wastes employers’ financial resources. It should be noted that the num-
ber of claims accepted at the Employment Tribunal has declined steadily for the last 
two years: a fall of 15% from the 2010–11 year and 21% from the 2009–10 figure.45
4. themeS
The unifying idea of this section is that the reforms are premised on cost certainty 
for employers; that is, eliminating ‘vexatious’ actions and streamlining the claims 
process so that the overall numbers are reduced thereby presenting a cost saving on 
employment regulation.
a. (Vexatious) claims as a hindrance to economic growth
These reforms are most significant because they retrench the practice of employ-
ment law. First, there is a subtle indictment of lawyers and rights litigation. Since 
financial resources are not as plentiful amongst workers, contingency fee arrange-
ments have become more common. Despite Jackson LJ’s endorsement,46 criticism 
persists against no-win-no-fee arrangements which (to many) take the risk off of the 
worker.47 Moorhead, bringing the assertion into question, contends that ‘lawyers have 
incentives to proceed only with cases that are economically viable’.48 If the aim is to 
curb the number of claims, then the issue includes regulation of how the law pro-
cesses these claims, and this necessarily involves lawyers. In effect, employment law 
is being retrenched. These reforms taint rights litigation in a manner so as to make 
launching a claim economically impracticable if not socially contrarian. Somehow 
those who make employment claims are automatically viewed as potential abusers of 
the system (vexatious litigants) and, now, these individuals are being said to threaten 
45 Ministry of Justice, Employment Tribunals and EAT Statistics, 2011–12 (1 April 2011 to 31 
March 2012) (20 September 2012).
46 R. Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (London: Judiciary of England 
and Wales, 2010), [12.4.1].
47 See Beecroft, 8.
48 R. Moorhead, ‘An American Future? Contingency Fees, Claims Explosions and Evidence 
from Employment Tribunals’ (2010) 75 Modern Law Review 752–84, 762.
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the country’s economy. Moreover, these amendments suggest little confidence in tri-
bunals and courts and despite low claimant success rates (if one measures Tribunal 
efficiency in this manner). The growing force of the adverse attitude towards employ-
ment regulation is perhaps the most dangerous challenge to access to rights redress.
Second, employment law is being reformed based on a concept of flexibility. 
Throughout this package of changes, flexibility has been about meeting business needs 
through the fluctuations of the economy so that employers may ‘hire people to meet 
new challenges, knowing they can reduce the size of their workforce if economic cir-
cumstances require’.49 Economic pressures do not obscure the significant challenges to 
access to employment law redress posed by these reforms. The effect of these amend-
ments may not be readily noticeable for some time, but the practice of this discipline 
(especially on the claimant side) must confront these reforms. The shift is unmistak-
able: a movement away from dispute resolution to conflict management where the 
latter (as a result of reforms like fees) is a construct leveraged in favour of employers.
Finally, a troubling rhetoric underlies these changes. Workers are characterised 
with nefarious undertones; possessing a savvy understanding of employment law 
which (it seems) evades employers’ own. For example, section 65 of the ERRA has 
repealed section 40(2)-(4) of the Equality Act 2012 which allowed for third-party 
liability for harassment at work. Beecroft championed the change: ‘The legislation 
clearly creates a temptation for workers to conspire with each other or with custom-
ers to create a harassment situation which might result in substantial financial com-
pensation from their employer’.50 The description ascribes a high level of deviance 
to workers as a class and to an extent that it tests the boundaries of credibility. The 
concept of the vexatious litigant presumes an intricate knowledge of employment 
law, its procedure and any opportunistic strategies; not to mention individuals who 
are willing to risk sums of money on ‘bets’ of dubious return as noted by low suc-
cess rates. The perspective advanced (overtly by Beecroft and more subtly in these 
reforms) remains remarkably one sided for it presumes that no employers conduct 
themselves in an equally strategic manner. The premise for this singular approach 
originates in unrelentingly negative perceptions about the British workforce which 
in turn appear to be informing Government policy. If the dominant view of work-
ers remains one of widespread lethargy, the problem moves beyond employment 
regulation to something more pervasive, requiring attitudinal change. It remains a 
challenge to see how this situation could be entirely attributable to employment 
regulation alone.
Though some may point to previous reforms and how employment law trudged 
on, the consideration here is the accumulation of change: is there a point at which 
employment law can no longer remain a viable avenue for workplace redress?
49 Progress on Reform, 7.
50 Beecroft, 6.
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B. focus on Small Business
According to 2011 statistics from BIS, small-to-medium-sized firms accounted for 
58.8% of private sector employment.51 Seemingly with this substantial figure in 
mind, the Government has shifted the emphasis of regulation towards ease of use 
for those who are less likely to employ legal or human resource assistance.
The case for regulation in favour of SMEs has been developing for some time. 
There are two guiding factors: SMEs prefer to have an informal workplace; that is, 
few if any formal written policies.52 Consequently, these undertakings expose them-
selves to greater potential liability at employment tribunals for the absence of formal 
procedures. Gibbons wrote that small businesses preferred the informal workplace 
because expressing ‘problems in writing can act as a trigger for greater conflict’.53 
Empirical evidence has been marshalled to support this focus: ‘Wider research has 
shown that small employers are more likely to be involved in, and lose, employment 
tribunals, particularly those that did not follow formal processes when dealing with 
disputes’.54 The reason for loss at the Employment Tribunal is not attributable to the 
absence of HR support.55 More than their mere presence, the application of proce-
dures ‘makes the difference between winning or losing a case’.56
Given their desire to not spend money on outside advice, SMEs are relying on 
the Government. This cohort seeks free, bespoke materials readily accessible at any 
point in time.57 The scenario begs the question: if we want government to abstain 
from significant employment regulation, should it be relied upon to shore up gaps 
created by businesses? Moreover, SMEs’ expectations appear to contradict the 
essence of the ‘Big Society’.
c. Smes’ lack of awareness of employment regulation
The difficulty with the Government’s benchmark of SMEs is that while much may be 
done to benefit them, SMEs are most likely to be unaware of this largesse. The report 
of Jordan et al identified this curiosity: ‘There was no evidence that these employ-
ers were aware of the increased qualifying period for unfair dismissal’.58 Little sur-
prise should arise that confidence in being compliant with regulations increased with 
51 BIS, Business Population Estimates for the UK and Regions 2011, http://www.bis.gov.uk/
assets/biscore/statistics/docs/b/business-population-estimates-2011_statistical-release.pdf 
(date last accessed 22 October 2013).
52Employers who do not have procedures were identified as smaller sized operations in the 
Workplace Employment Relations Study: WERS [2011], 27.
53Gibbons, 2.11.
54Jordan et al (i) citing Saridakis et al.
55 Saridakis et al., 492.
56 Ibid., 493.
57 Jordan et al. (iv).
58 Ibid., 29.
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larger employers who had developed formal policies and was low amongst SMEs. 
It may be quizzical as to why although ‘these employers felt they were at risk of 
litigation there was little motivation to change their working practices because they 
believed that working informally maintained better working relationships with staff 
and ensured managerial autonomy’ (ii).59 The decision to adhere to informality 
for reasons of staff morale can be valid, but this does not eliminate the risk these 
employers run in not having procedures to apply when circumstances arise.
Given SMEs’ ignorance of regulations being made for their benefit coupled with 
a seeming reluctance to be better informed, one must wonder at the extensive pack-
age being unveiled. SMEs’ anxiety has driven these changes and yet that anxiety will 
remain.60 The difficulty here lies not in regulation but in informing a reluctant group. 
SMEs’ inflated sense of risk in the absence of accurate information (and one could 
add reinforcing such an attitude by legislating based on this quicksand) creates a 
moving target for reform efforts.
A better foundation through which to achieve desired goals may be the promo-
tion of accurate information for both workers and SMEs. Only now have details 
regarding median awards been provided on ET1 and ET3 forms.61 These figures are 
lower and more representative (£4,560) than the average awards (£9,133) which are 
buoyed by a few larger sums.62
Another (though perhaps more controversial) focus is to address the perception 
of employment advice as an unnecessary expenditure or luxury. An intriguing illus-
tration arises from accounting. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
notes that accountants are being asked by their clients for employment advice.63 
Clearly SMEs prefer a one-stop source of information. Reliance on accountants by 
this cohort illustrates that the work done by those in employment law is undervalued.
5. concluSIon
There was a time when ETs were encompassed by the acronym ADR. These reforms 
clearly demonstrate this to no longer be the case. The aim of these reforms has 
ostensibly been economic improvement and yet one cannot easily gloss over the 
second-class treatment of employment regulation and those working within it. There 
is a movement away from informality and towards greater procedural formality.64 
59Jordan et al., (ii).
60Ibid., (i).
61 Progress on Reform, 25.
62 Ministry of Justice, ‘Employment Tribunals and EAT Statistics, 2011–12 (1 April 2011 to 31 
March 2012) (20 September 2012).
63 Business Advice to SMEs: Human Resources and Employment (2011).
64 A movement which it has been suggested has been underway for some time: S. Corby and 
P. L. Latreille, ‘Employment Tribunals and the Civil Courts: Isomorphism Exemplified’ (2012) 
41 ILJ 387–406, 397.
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Gibbons called for the abolition of the 2004 Regulations which promoted formal-
ity (in relation to the Employment Act 2002, Gibbons found that ‘increased use of 
formal processes has been an unnecessary burden that has not increased the rate of 
resolution’)65 but here there is greater codification even if it is aimed at reducing the 
burden on employers. Curiously contradiction seems inevitable: the reforms formal-
ise much, and yet, this is in opposition to the wishes of SMEs. The Government has 
skipped an important step which is clearly present in the information before them. 
Efforts must be made to inform claimants and SMEs about the process of employ-
ment law. Then Government must permit the different layers of dispute resolution to 
unfold. The current reforms package seems more suited to arrive after the first step 
has been embraced, employed and found wanting.
DAV I D   M A N GA N * 
University of Leicester 
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65Gibbons, 2.10.
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